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EDITORIAL
ANALYSIS OF AUTOMOBILE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The automobile has become a very important factor in our economic,
legal and social life and very naturally has required considerable legis-
lation in its regulation. The also conceded fact that it is at all times
a potential destroyer of life and property requires a more stringent
regulation, and control by penal statutes for violations than the 'old
laws which were used for pedestrian and horse drawn traffic. Since
1925 most states of the Union have adopted some kind of automobile
financial responsibility legislation. In reviewing the statutes, five
methods are used: compulsory insurance for all automobiles;' com-
pulsory insurance only for 'offenders;2 that type of legislation which
applies the principle of workmen's compensation; 3 that type of legis-
lation compelling the automobilist himself to pay a definite uninsurable
portion of the damage; 4 that type of legislation of looking to the
offender's automobile to pay damages.5 For convenience, we might
divide the above classification into two classes: (1) Compulsory insur-
ance and (2) Automobile financial responsibility laws.
To begin with the latter differs from the former in that they seek
to spread the insuring of automobiles by indirection instead of com-
pulsion. Indiana is one of the more recent states to adopt this method.6
Succinctly, the Indiana Statute provides that in -the event a motor-
ist is found guilty of any of certain motor vehicle offenses or has a
judgment rendered against him for more than $100 in a case arising
from automobile accident, the driver's license of such motorist shall
be suspended and shall not be restored until he is able to show "proof
of financial responsibility." What constitutes such proof of financial
responsibility is explained below.
This statute does not require everyone to .carry insurance. It has
no effect whatever upon a motorist until and unless he is found guilty
of violating one of the traffic laws recapitulated in the ensuing para-
graph or has a judgment rendered against him in the amount mentioned.
A person's operator's license and/or chauffeur's license will be sus-
pended whenever sdch-person: I. Is convicted or pleads guilty or
forfeits bond for any of the following offenses: (1) Driving while
drunk; (2) Homicide or assault arising out of the operation of an
I Massachusetts Plan.
2 Stone and Connecticut Plans.
3 Marx Plan.
4 Swiss Plan.
5 Maritime Lien Plan.
6 AcTs OF 1931. Law became effective Oct. 31, 1931.
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automobile; (3) Reckless driving, resulting in personal injury or prop-
erty damage; (4) Leaving the scene of an accident without giving his
name; (5) Driving without a license; (6) Driving an unregistered car;
or (7) Any other -violation of the law requiring suspension or revoca-
tion of a license; or II. Has a judgment rendered against him in any
court in this country or in Canada, for c images for personal injury
(including death) or property damage in excess of $100 resulting from
the ownership, maintenance, use or operation of an automobile.
The license shall not be restored until such person furnishes
proof of financial responsibility. Such proof means proof of ability
to pay damages for any future automobile accident, to the extent
of $5,000 for injury to or death of any one person, and $10,000 for
personal injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident,
and $1,000 for damage to property in any one accident. Such proof
may be evidenced by: (1) The certificate of an insurance company
authorized to do business in Indiana, covering all automobiles then
registered in the name of the person named; or (2) A bond of a surety
c6mpany authorized to do business in Indiana, or a real estate bond
signed by at least two individual sureties, each owning real estate in the
state; or (3) Evidence of a deposit with the state treasurer or other
proper officer of the sum of $11,000 in cash or satisfactory securities.
There has arisen much comment as to the constitutionality of such
enactment and to dispose of this major issue it might be well to show
along what lines the courts have travelled in the interpretation of
similar statutes.
The exponents were Massachusetts and New Hampshire who in
1925 discussed its constitutionality prior to the enactment of the
law and found by the able opinion of the justices at the invocation of
the legislatures that the law was constitutional. 7 It was contended
that the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution was violated
through discrimination and many objections were propounded: that
state-owned cars being exempt under the proposed law rendered it un-
constitutional; the variation between resident and non-resident secur-
ity; that the proposed law would violate the constitutional provision
giving the United States (not the states individually) control of in-
terstate commerce. These discriminations were untenable in view of
7 (a) In Re Opinion of Justices, 147 N. E. 680 (Mass. 1925) (Declaring
constitutional a proposed "compulsory insurance law" and a law to protect the
public against financially irresponsible people).
(b) In Re Opinion of the Justices, 120 AtI. 117, 39 A. L. R. 1023 (N. H.
1925) (Valid and constitutional since the state has authority over public high-
ways and has power to provide for public safety by regulation of undertakings
which are inherently dangerous, the legislature may require persons to provide
for insurance).
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the police power of the states and because the constitution of the
United States allows the states to provide for the establishment, main-
tenance and control of public highways, turnpikes and roads.8
As the automobile insurance laws existed in 1929 thirteen states
had one type or another automobile financial responsibility laws.
Among these was California. 9 The statute will be quoted primarily'
because its constitutionality is now being questioned by the courts.
"The operators or chauffeur's license and all of the registration certi-
ficates, of any person, in the event of his failure to satisfy every judg-
ment within fifteen days from the time it shall have become finally
rendered against him by a court of competent jurisdiction in this or
any other state, or in a district court of the United States, for damages
on account of personal injury, or damages to property in excess of one
hundred dollars resulting from the ownership or operation of a motor
vehicle by him, his agent, or any other person with the express or
implied consent of the owner shall be forthwith suspended by the chief
of the division of motor vehicles, upon receiving a certified copy of such
final judgment or judgments from the court in which the same are
rendered and shall remain suspended and shall not be renewed nor shall
any motor vehicle be thereafter registered in his name, while any such
judgment remains unsatisfied and subsisting, and until the said per-
son give proof of his ability to respond in damages as defined in section
36 1/2 of this act, for future accidents." 10
In Ex Parte Lindley," a California case, a driver was convicted un-
der the clause of the act making its violation a misdemeanor, and sought
a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the statute was unconsti-
tutional. The appellate court held the statute unconstitutional and
against the 14th Amendment. Upon review the Supreme Court in
Watson v. Division of Motor Vekicles 12 held the statute constitutional
by divided court, citing principally in support the Massachusetts dis-
cussion in the Opinion of Justices 13 and a United States Supreme
Court decision. 14
In 1930 New York approved of a bill 15 similar to that adopted in
California, extra-territorial in nature specifying the suspension of oper-
8 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650 (1885). Nor
does the fact that the law does not apply to private property render it unfair
as the police power only extends over the public highways.
9 LAWS Or 1929, chaps. 258, 259, 262 (Constitutionality of statute now be-
ing questioned by courts).
10 DmaGs GEN. LAWS 1229 Surp., p. 3451, S. 73g.
11 291 Pac. 638 (Cal. 1930).
12 298 Pac. 481 (Cal. 1931).
13 Op. dt. supra note 7a.
14 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1914).
15 LAws op 1930, chap. 398.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ating license and registration certificates as a penalty for failure to
comply with the act. Other states which have financial regulation
are: Connecticut,18 Iowa,1" Maine,' 8 Minnesota, 19 New Jersey,20
North Dakota,21 Rhode Island,22 Vermont,23 and Wisconsin. 2 4
The cases mentioned illustrate that -the laws of automobile insur-
ance and financial responsibility are not unconstitutional. Indigent
motorists are a constant menace to society and as a consequence of
their impecunity hundreds of thousands of people have no recourse
and are what heretofore were termed "victims of circumstance." In
1927 in the state of California alone considering only Los Angeles, San
Francisco and Alameda Counties out of 762 fatal accident cases (ante-
cedent to compulsory insurance) 50 cases were paid as a result- of
"insurance carried while only 15 were paid where there was no insur-
ance."  Some progressive move should be accepted in this highly ad-
vanced mechanical age to preserve life rather than to destroy it and in
so doing keep toute avant scientifically, legally, economically and so-
cially. These financial, responsibility laws seem to be permanently
entrenched in our legal and economic systems today. They are sound
and cannot be made too stringent if their objective, the protection of
huma. interests and lives, is to be accomplished. The Indiana Statute
and similar statutes of other states demanding financial responsibility
are without question a step in the proper direction but lack a definite-
ness which deficiency allows for "loop holes" by which offenders may
evade the law. It is not to be inferred from this observation -that
the conceivers of such a bill had this in mind, for such reaction to the
law was not then forc~able and it is only after application that such
defects appear.
In regard to accidents involving a loss of under one hundred dollars,
caused by violation, of any of the traffic laws enumerated earlier in
this comment, the law requires nothing of the owner, operator, or both,
of motor vehicles and they retain liberties and continue as before
without effect of the statute. In the event a motorist causes an acci-
dent in a state adopting a financial responsibility law, repairs to a
state wherein there is no such enforcement he is not necessarily sub-
ject to any financial responsibility in the latter state in which he con-
16 AcTS oF 1929, chaps. 297, 300.
17 LAWS op 1929, chap. 118.
18 LAWS ov 1929, chap. 209.
19 LAWS OF 1927, chap. 412.
20 LAws or 1929, chap. 116 amended by LAWS oF 1930, chap. 267.
21 LAWS OF 1929, chap. 163.
22 LAws oF 1929, chap. 1429.
23 AcTs oF 1927, Act. No. 81 amended by AcTs oF 1929 (Acts Nos. 76, 77).
24 STATUTs or 1929, clhap. 85.
25 THE CommoNwALTH, Vol. V., No. 15, Table 1.
